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I.
This is an attorney malpractice case brought by Appellant

Ciccarello against

Respondents Jeffrey Bo Davies and his law firm, Marcus Christian Hardee and Davies, LLP. 1

For a number of years prior to 20] 3, Respondent Davies had acted as Appellant's
In his capacity as Appellant'

Davies

Appellant (and his various businesses) in several matters (attending meetings with Appellant,
and drafting letters, contracts and other documents) as well as representing Appellant in his
divorce proceeding. Id.; see also R000301.
In February of 2012, Appellant started F.E.M. Distribution, LLC ("F.E.M"). F.E.M.
marketed, sold and distributed a product line called "Lotus Electronic Cigarettes." R000022.
Appellant was the only member ofF.E.M. 000310.
In 2013, Appellant began dealing with certain criminal legal charges related to his
operation of another company he owned that marketed and sold synthetic cannabinoids (aka
"spice"). R0002. 2 As a consequence of those charges, some inventory of F.E.M. was seized by
the Federal authorities. R000625.
Thereafter, wishing to avoid any further seizure/forfeiture activities, and to continue to
run a company with F.E.M.'s remaining assets, supply contracts, etc., Appellant contemplated
selling F.E.M assets to another, new company. R000022.

1

The underlying case had named additional defendants, however, Appellant settled his claims
against those defendants and they are not parties to this appeal.
Although Appellant aggressively defended these charges, he ultimately entered into an
agreement related to the charges and stipulated to an Order of Forfeiture and plea agreement.
R000079.
2
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Appellant and Respondent Davies had several conversations and meetings about the sale

F

. and the various

it could

Respondent Davies first assisted Appellant in an attempt to sell F.E.M. to a group of
potential investors from

Washington,

as

Thompson Group.

Davies, reviewed sale documents and attended meetings with members ofthe Thompson Group
and Appellant. R0003 l 1. The contemplated structure of the sale was to form a main LLC that
consisted of hvo LLCs, in one of which the Appellant would

a mc\jority interest. That sale

did not materialize. Id.
Follmving the failed sale to Thompson Group, at Appellant's request, Respondent Davies
put

a group of investors to consider the purchase of F.E.M. from Appellant. R000082.

This sale did materialize, and in June of2013 F.E.M.

into a purchase agreement with

Lotus Vaping Technologies, LLC ("Lotus"). R000022.
Respondent Davies drafted all documents related to the sale of F.E.M. to Lotus. Id. The
documents used in the sale were the same set of documents that were used (and drafted by), the
Thompson Group, with some modification. ROOOlOO.
The members of Lotus included Vapor Investors, LLC ("Vapor"), with a 55% ownership
interest in Lotus, and Baus Investment Group, LLC ("Baus"), with a 45% ownership interest
Lotus. Respondent Davies had a 2% ownership interest in Vapor and based on information and
belief, has a 2.2% ownership interest in Baus. R000022. 3
As consideration for the sale ofF.E.M., it was agreed that Appellant would be paid the
purchase price of $2 Million, and receive 64.44% ownership in Baus. R0003 72.

3

When Appellant sold F.E.M., he gave Respondent Davies, and Respondent Davies agreed to
accept, "points" in Vapor Investors, LLC, as compensation for his drafting the documents
associated with the sale and assisting in putting the sale together. R000311. Respondent Davies
never invested any of his own money in Vapor Investors, Inc. Id.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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investors were allegedly concerned about Appellant's criminal charges, and in line
with

14

in April

months prior to

actual

with the consent of all members of Lotus (000082, 000373), it was decided that Bob Henry4
would hold

s

Appellant's benefit, and that he would

m

return them upon Appellant's request. R000023-24.
Thus, the original operating
Henry. However, all involved
in all

acted as

Appellant's

listed in the name of

(or "points") as Appellant' shares. Appellant,

owner and was treated as an O\Yner in Lotus, as he not only ran

Lotus, but also attended and

at member meetings, etc. R000086.

One of the documents drafted by Respondent Davies was titled "Independent Contractor
Agreement." R000023. The Independent Contractor Agreement ("ICA") provided that
Appellant would serve as an independent contractor for Lotus in exchange for a payment of
$10,000 per month for sixteen years (equal to the $2M purchase price).
The ICA also contained a provision that provided that payments due under the agreement
would cease during any period Appellant was incarcerated, as well as a provision that the
agreement was terminable by Lotus upon certain conditions. R000023.
No explanation was provided to Appellant regarding the referenced provisions contained
in the ICA by Respondent Davies. The understanding amongst Respondent Davies, the investors
and Appellant, was that when the authorities confirmed they were not interested in the assets of
Appellant or Lotus, Mr. Henry would return to Appellant "points" in Baus, and the ICA would
become void and another one would be written or become effective as a non-terminable contract.
R000626.

4

Mr. Henry is manied to Appellant's ex-girlfriend and step-father to their son.
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Respondent Davies repeatedly affirmed io Appellant that his ownership/seller position
was

that all

had

taken to

future

R000626. 5 That is, the ICA was supposed to be temporary, not terminable, and all involved ,vere
111

on this

as

return

Appellant's points

.I

R000083-

84. 6
Following the sale of F.

In January 201

to Lotus, Appellant continued to act as

Lotus and

the Federal Government issued a letter stating they had no interest

Appellant or Lotus. R000626. Thereafter, Appellant notified Respondents that the transaction
documents could be modified and

points in Baus returned. Id.

Come to find out, Respondents had taken no measure to assure and/or put no mechanism
in place to return Appellant's shares in Baus to him, or to replace or modify the ICA with an
agreement that reflected the parties' original agreement i.e. one that paid Appellant $10,000 per

Respondent Davies also told Appellant's sister, Holly Ciccarello "not to worry, the he made
sure Mark was taken care of and that the contracts he wrote would protect Mark" and his
ownership interest in Lotus ... that the way he drafted the 'consultant' agreement which was
actually [his] partial buyout of the business, in addition to ownership interest in the business
(Baus) - was the best way to proceed, and that the agreement would be changed after it was
determined it was safe to do so ... " R000304.

5

At all relevant time periods, Respondent Davies informed Appellant that the way he drafted the
"consultant" agreement which was actually Appellant's paiiial buy out for F.E.M., in addition
to his ownership interest in Baus - was the best way to proceed, and that the agreement would be
changed after the they were ce1iain there was no risk of future forfeiture for Lotus. R000083-84;
R000628; see also R000311 ("Mr. Davies had repeatedly told me the documents related to the
sale of F .E.M., including the Independent Contractor Agreement, would be redrafted after my
criminal matters were cleared to protect my interests. Again, he was always acting on my behalf
and never indicated to me that he was acting on behalf of anyone else or was not in fact my
attorney"), see also R000374 ("I also relied on Mr. Davies' representations that the documents
would be changed after the risk of forfeiture was gone, as he was my attorney and I believed he
was acting in my best interest").
6
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month until the

purchase price was paid, without affording Lotus the option to terminate
and/or not pay

purchase

F.E.M.

certain

In the Fall of 2014, shortly after the sale, Appellant was ousted from Lotus by its
members (including

and

Davies) and

over

role as

CEO of Lotus. R000024. 7
Appellant was incarcerated in June of 2014 and was paid by Lotus
until July of 201

10,000

month)

,vhich payments were never resumed. RD00024. Following the sale of

F.E.M, Appellant had no other source of income to support his family. Id. 8
Respondent Davies represented to several individuals, and repeatedly affirmed to
Appellant, that the

documents would be

at a later

and/or

he had

sure" that Appellant would be taken care of. However, Respondent Davies neglected to take
appropriate measures to make sure this happened, to the great detriment of Appellant, who has
been damaged in an amount not less than $2 Million. R000091.
Nearly a year later, in early 2015, Respondent Davies informed Appellant that attorney
Corey Rippee (who Respondent Davies sent Appellant to on the stated basis that he had a
conflict, i.e. due to his representation of Appellant) would redraft the ICA so that it was non-

7

The investors stayed "at bay" until Appellant had Lotus up and rum1ing with all business
relationships and operations developed, and then they "pulled the rug" from their original
agreement with Appellant and prevented Appellant from running Lotus and being paid for
F.E.M. R000085.
8

After Appellant received notice from the Federal Government in January of 2014 that it had no
interest in Lotus, Appellant discussed with Respondent Davies and the investors in Lotus, that
payments to Appellant would not stop if he became incarcerated. Based on communications
with Lotus and Respondent Davies, Appellant understood that the provision pertaining nonpayment of the $10,000 per month was in the ICA and would only be acted upon if Lotus needed
operating capital during any period Appellant was incarcerated, which was not the case when
Appellant became incarcerated. R000627.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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terminable. R000312. Ultimately, after a new agreement was drafted, members of Lotus did not
of this

and so the new

Lotus. Id.

was never

Mr. Rippee also assisted Appellant in attempting to get his points in Baus back from Mr.
titled

a

by

been drafted by Respondent
Appellant' points in Baus

Purchase

R000043. Ultimately Mr. Henry

drafted with
to justify

Respondents' first Motion for
to the

to transfer

to Appellant
admits throughout the pleadings on file in

connection

that had

Judgment),

of F.E.M. to Lotus were adverse to

case (and primarily in
documents he
which he atiempts

claiming that he represented Lotus in that transaction. R000500. See also R000647

wherein Respondent Davies affirms he represented F.E.M., the entity, not Appellant in his
personal capacity, in the attempted sale ofF.E.M. to Thompson Group); see also Tr. Vol. I, p.
15, LL 21-23, "Mr. Davies position in this case is that his client was Lotus and Lotus investors";
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 18, LL 8

11, Court: "But you just told me that Ciccarello is not his client. So,

therefore, whose instructions is he following? Mr. Brady: Lotus."
Respondent Davies never communicated to Appellant at any point that he didn't consider
himself Appellant's attorney, or that he wasn't acting as Appellant's attorney or in his best
interests, up and until this litigation was filed. R000302. As previously noted, during all relevant
time periods, Respondent Davies represented to Appellant and others that he was protecting
Appellant's interests.
Early in the litigation Respondent Davies asserted that he represented F.E.M. in the
transaction with the Thompson Group, and thereafter, Respondent Davies then asserted that
Appellant asked him if he wanted to buy F .E.M. from Appellant, which Appellant disputes.
R000202. Later in this litigation, Davies asserted that he represented Lotus in the subject
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transaction (sale of F.E.M. to Lotus). R000399.
Lotus).

Respondent

also R000402 (Davies drafted the ICA on

did not inform

lant of his

representation or ask his permission to do so, nor that he no longer represented Appellant or that
counsel.
Respondent Davies stated, in opposition to Appellant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, "[ t]ellingly, the Independent Contractor J\grcmcnt contained a provision that '"""'-'·''"''-'
to Plaintiff Ciccarello should Ciccarello become incarcerated, at the time a
later. fulfilled

risk to Ciccarello; this provision inured directly to Lotus' benefit as

befits an agreement drafted by Lotus' attorney, Davies, and negotiated against Plaintiff
Ciccarello, a then-unrepresented counter party." R000402.
Respondents owed a duty of care to Appellant and they breached that duty by self-dealing
against the interests of Appellant, drafting documents that blatantly jeopardized Appellant's
rights, and took action in circumstances in which he clearly had a conflict with Appellant.
R.000031

32.

B. Course of Proceedings.
The Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial was filed in the underlying case on
April 19, 2016.
On December 21, 2016, Mr. Henry filed a motion for summary judgment seeking an
Order from the District Court that he O\:vned the subject shares in Baus and that Appellant had no
claim of ownership or bailment. R000458.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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On April 20, 2017, Respondent's filed their first motion for summary judgment seeking
an

,vere

from the District Court that Appellant'
19(4). R00191. 9

applicable statute oflimitations, LC. §

July 31, 2017,

by

filed a motion for partial

order from the District Court that

an
at all relevant time periods had an

client relationship.
On Septern ber

17, the Districl

respective motions for summary judgment
On October 25, 2017,
of attorney expert

lant filed his
C.

an Order denying the parties'
judgment. R000458.
Witness Disclosure including the
The disclosure contained a summary of Mr.

Larsen's opinions regarding Respondents' breaches of the standard of care with respect to their
representation of Appellant in the sale of F.E.M. to Lotus. R000469.
Also on October 25, 2017, Appellant filed his Motion to Amend the Complaint to add a
claim of punitive damages against Respondents on the basis that their actions with respect to
Appellant were wanton, oppressive and malicious. R000479; R000494.
On November 16, 2017, Respondent Davies filed his Second Motion for Summary
Judgment. R000502. The motion was premised on the following argument: "even assuming

arguendo that an attorney-client relationship existed between Davies and Ciccarello at the
relevant times, Plaintiffs' malpractice claim against Davies must fail because Plaintiffs cannot
show that Davies Failed to perform a duty undertaken in the representation of Ciccarello."
R000510. Put another way, Respondents did exactly what Appellant asked them to do

Worthy of note is that from the onset of this litigation, Respondents continually denied having
any attorney client relationship with Appellant. R00408.

9
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(protecting assets from forfeiture), therefore, Appellant cannot assert that Respondents breached
duty to him.
On November 20, 2017, Respondent Law Firm filed a separate Second Motion for
umrnary Judgment on

same

exactly what Appellant

as

that

him to do (protec1ing assets from forfeiture), therefore, Appellant

cannot claim Respondents breached a duty to him. R000599.

In response to tbe respective
filed December

2017, Appellant

the assets of F
Appellant wanted to

to

Motions for Summary .Judgment, in his opposition
out that

one of the goals the investors was that

protected from forfeiture. R000631 . Hmvever, at the

paid for the

of F.E.M., or

million dollars and an

interest in Baus. That was the deal.. Respondents ignored this fact (which is the crux of the
lawsuit) in their respective motions for summary judgment; "[w ]hat Defendants ignore is the fact
[that] Mr. Ciccarello was supposed to get paid for F.E.M., $2M. R000633.
Pursuant to the District Court's Scheduling Order, on January 24, 2018, Appellant filed
the Declaration of Brian C. Larsen; Rebuttal Expert Disclosure, which rebutted opinions of
Richard D. Greener, that had been filed by Respondents on December 22, 2017. R000750.
On January 25, 2018, the District Court entered an Order granting Respondents' Second
Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Appellant's motion to amend as futile. R000757.
In sum, the District Comi found that notwithstanding the several issues of material fact
that were raised in Appellant's opposition to the motions (i.e. that Respondent Davies did not do
everything that Appellant requested), that Mr. Larsen (Appellant's expert) had to testify "not that
Mr. Ciccarello got a deal with adverse terms or that the terms ultimately hmi Mr. Ciccarello, but
that a non-negligent attorney would have got better deal terms that would have had a better
result." R000763; see also R00764 ("Mr. Davies may have been acting negligently, though Mr.
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Ciccarello's expert has to testify that Mr. Ciccarello would have received a better deal terms that

a

. Ciccarello

had been

Mr. Ciecarello's expert has not offered such testimony, as so Mr. Ciccarello's claim fails").
R000764.
On January 29, 2018, Appellant filed his Motion for Reconsideration. The motion ,vas
supported by the
District

of Brian C. Larsen (the rebuHal declaration filed one day before the

issued its January

filed January

2018 decision) and a Second Declaration of

2018. R000776.

In its decision ·

1, 2018, the District Court denied Appellant's Motion

Reconsideration. R000807.
On May 7,2018, Appellant filed his motion for relief under IRCP 60. R000812. The
District Court treated the motion as a second motion for reconsideration, and denied that motion
in its Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Order Granting Defendants' Second Motion
for Summary Judgment, dated August 1, 2018. R000882.
This appeal follows.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The issues on appeal listed herein are modified slightly from those stated in the Notice of
Appeal in an effort to streamline the arguments and avoid duplication of facts and argument.
Specifically, as noted above, the District Court's Ruling denying Appellant's IRCP 60 motion,
analyzed the motion as one for reconsideration, thus the issues on appeal set forth below
reference that analysis without reference to IRCP 60, as set forth in the notice of appeal.
a.

Did the District Court error in granting Respondents' Second Motion for

Summary Judgment, by finding that a plaintiff in an attorney malpractice case is required to file

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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an
JS

affidavit to overcome a motion for summary judgment. notwithstanding that the motion
,vrought

on a
b.

Did the District Court error in denying Plaintiffs' :f\1otion(s) for Reconsideration

to

ll1

that Plaintiff

have filed a separate motion for an

an a,vard of attorney
120(3)

that motion,

finding

of time under IRCP Rule 5

and costs incurred on

pursuant to 1

§

IRCP

This Court in Reynolds v. Trout Jones, 154 Idaho 21,
prevailing

may be entitled to attorney fees under § 1

P.3cl

(201

held "the

in an action for legal

malpractice so long as a commercial transaction occurred behveen the prevailing party and the
party from whom that party seeks fees." Id. at 27,293 P.3d at 651 (emphasis added).
This Court went on to say that as long as the commercial transaction (i.e. that
transaction between the prevailing party and the partyfi'om whom that party seeks.fees) is at the
center of the lawsuit, the prevailing party may be entitled to attorney fees for claims that are
fundamentally related to the commercial transaction yet sound in tort. Id., see also Soignier v.

Fletcher, wherein this Court held that the transaction between the attorney and client was
commercial in nature. 151 ldaho 322,326,256 P.3d 730, 734 (2011).
Because Appellant and Respondents had a commercial transaction between them, as they
had an attorney client relationship, Appellant is entitled to fees and costs on appeal as the
prevailing paiiy.
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to overcome a
is

on a

This Court revie,vs a grant of summary judgment under the same
standard of review the district court originally applied in its ruling. Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho
19, 23,333 P.3d 130,134 (2014) (citingArreguiv. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801,804,291
P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012)). Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movan1 is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." I.R.C.P. 56(a).
"When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable
inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Liberty Bankers L[fe Ins. Co. v. Wither.spoon,
Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., 159 ldaho 679,685,365 P.3d 1033, 1039 (2016). The moving
party has the burden of establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact. Wattenbarger v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308,317,246 P.3d 961,970 (2010).

"If the moving pmiy has demonstrated the absence of a question of material fact, the
burden shifts to the nornnoving party to demonstrate an issue of material fact that will preclude
summary judgment." Id. (citations omitted). The nom11oving pmiy must present evidence
contradicting that submitted by the movant, and which demonstrates a question of material fact.
Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225,228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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1.

Vi'ere a

a

it is

to this

to appreciate

nature of Appellant's

claim against Respondents in the underlying litigation - Respondents' negligence caused him to
damaged by effeetively causing him to

his ownership interest in

and lose

for

the sale of F
There are two
Appellant by Respondents in

The first stage

that were contemplated, discussed and promised to

of

underlying case.

Respondents'

was to draft

documents that guarded

F.E.M./Appellant's assets from the threat of forfeiture. 10 Whether forfeiture ofF.E.M./Lotus
assets was a true threat or whether the drafted documents would have effectively safeguarded
assets against forfeiture is irrelevant.
The second stage came after the threat of forfeiture, if any, had passed. Then
Respondents affirmed the would effectuate the "real" deal; Appellant would receive his shares in
Baus, and would be paid $2M for the sale of F.E.M. to Lotus.

Appellant testified several times in the underlying case that Respondents drafted the sale
documents, including the ICA and he "just signed it" because he didn't take it seriously, he was
told by Respondents that it was just a temporary document, that was to be superseded by a
permanent document at a later time. See e.g., R000620. In addition, Respondent Davies
represented Lotus and its investors. Counsel for Respondent Davies has affirmatively
represented that "[y Jou had another side of the parties to the contract. They're the Lotus investor
group. They had 15, 20 investors and were having input too. Mr. Ciccarello didn't go and say "I
want A, B, C." He may have said that, but he got A and D because the other side didn't want C.
And this is in the record, that there were negotiations that went on with this thing." Tr., Vol. I, p.
32, LL 10 18. This representation certainly creates an issue of material fact against
Respondents; as they did not do "exactly" as Appellant instructed, but also what fellow investors
of Lotus wanted.
10
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Respondents· Second

for Summary Judgment focused on the first stage only; that
assets

forfeiture,

therefore, Appellant cannot complain that Respondents breached any duty to him, even if they
\Vere acting as

!ant's

they did

as he

The premise of Respondents' motions YVas simply untenable. Reponden1s cannot turn a
blind

to Respondent Davies'
were protected, or that

regarding the sale of F

representations and assurances to Appellant that his
,vould

drafted 10

the parties'

and Appellant's compensation therefore, after the threat of

government involvement, if any, had passed.
elephant in

room is ... why would it matter to Appellant \Vhether F.E.M./Lotus

assets were seized or not ifhe wasn't going to be paid for the sale of F.E.M.?
Respondents didn't tell Appellant "hey, with these documents the assets are protected but
it will be up to us (Lotus) to decide at a later time whether we will pay you for the sale of
F.E.M." That wasn't the deal. Quite to the contrary, Respondents repeatedly represented to
Appellant, Appellant's sister, Lotus investors, etc. that new documents and/or agreements would
be put in place to assure Appellant's interests were protected, and that he would be paid for the
sale of F.E.M. according to the parties' agreement.
In opposition to Respondent's motion for summary judgment, and specifically in
response to the argument "we did everything he asked us to"
obvious

Appellant only pointed out the

no, Respondents didn't do everything ... there were no agreements in place to assure

Appellant's interests were protected, and he was not paid for the sale of F.E.M. according to the
parties' agreement. These issues of material fact alone should have precluded summary
judgement.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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The burden should have never shified to the Appellant, as Respondents failed to
the

a question

material fact

Appellant's position ,vas best framed by Respondent Davies' counsel, Mr. Brady:
Q.

I think

crux

this lawsuit is the mvnership interest

you feel you

own in Baus has not been transferred to you, correct?

A.

would

the independent contractor agreement and the

The

independent contractor agreement then stopped so I no longer get the money that I was promised.
And the points that Bob was holding have not been transferred back into my name nmv.
re getting at
agreement that you had ,vith

1 take it you say there are breaches of side oral

. I Ienry to hold your shares.

Mr. Henry and Mr. Davies and the rest of the group were all in discussions about
the sale of the company and the value that it would have been sold for, which vvas

million.

The interests that I remained in Baus, which was being held by Bob, everybody understood, that
Bob was going to remain a 4 percent owner in Baus, the rest would be transferred back into my
name when the government gave a letter in January of 2014 stating they no longer had an interest
with my involvement with Lotus, which they did.
At that point, the paperwork was supposed to be rewritten to where the points
would be transferred into my name from Bob Henry, my shares, and that the independent
contractor agreement was to be more of a solid non-terminable payment or sale of the company.
Q.

Was Mr. Davies representing you at this time?

A.

I believe the whole time, yes, he has been representing me.

R000623.
Again, Respondents Motions for Summary Judgment were based on the following
premises: (1) Respondent followed Appellant's explicit instructions, and followed the tasks he
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,vas directed to perform by Appellant in structuring the sale of F.E.M.; and (2) there ,vas no
and directed the creation of the relevant entities

of

Respondents. In sum, Respondent's did exactly what Appellant told him to do. And because
told them to do, Respondent's argue, Appellant cannot
nol now later complain, or assert Responcleni's breached any duty to him; Appellant is estoppecl
from claiming a breach of duty

Respondent did exactly what

were asked to do.

fact allegations all have to do with the first stage only. Respondents' Second
Motions for Summary Judgment are entirely fact driven·- and based on false and/or disputed
material
Appellant repeatedly pointed out in opposition to Respondents' Appellant's did not
provide Respondents with explicit instructions, or direct Respondents to perform certain tasks
regarding structuring the sale of F.E.M. The sale was structured like the sale that was going to
be made to the Thompson Group, and Respondents used those forms to structure the Lotus sale.
R000594.
Moreover, in their motions, Respondents ignore what is readily apparent

Respondent

Davies created a mechanism for he and the Lotus investors not to pay Mr. Ciccarello the $2M
purchase price; the documents he drafted only protected the investors to the detriment of Mr.
Ciccarello ... The glaring disputed fact is that [Appellant] was supposed to get paid $2M.
Respondent Davies assured Appellant that he would draft an agreement that was not terminable,
and that he would continue to be paid under the new agreement, none of which occurred.
Because the Respondents' motions were fact driven, and because there were several
issues of material fact and/or disputed material facts pertaining to whether Respondents did or
did not in fact do "exactly" what Appellant told him to do - the District Comi should have
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stopped there and denied summary judgment, without more. Respondents clearly didn't satisfy
of establishing

were no

material

11

The District Court abused its discretion in granting Respondents' respective Second
for

Judgment
numerous,

to

to overcome

Again, the factual premise on which Respondent's motions were based was:
Respondents did everything Appellant asked them to do, therefore he cannot claim that
Respondents breached any duty to him. This is a false premise, and/or one riddled with genuine
issues of material fact. The motions should have been denied on that premise alone.
In sum, the District Court held that it didn't matter if there were issues of material fact, or
even if the motions were based on false facts, plaintiff still needed an expe1i affidavit.
In the Memorandum Decision and Ruling on Respondents' Second Motions for Summary
Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend ("Decision") (R0007 57), the District Court held that
"[t]he essential elements of [Appellant's] claim challenged on summary judgment are whether

11

Appellant is not dumb to the rules as they pertain to motions for summary judgment, or when
expert testimony is required in professional negligence cases. Appellant maintained that no
expert affidavit was necessary given the factual posture or Respondents' motions. See Tr., Vol.
I, p. 16, LL 6-9, "[i]fthere was no issue of material fact, you bet I should have filed an affidavit
of an expert. But the case law says if there is an issue of material fact, the court should deny the
motion.
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Mr. Davies's conduct [actually] breached a duty and whether that conduct proximately caused
damages. R000762 (bracket inserted).
Appellant does not dispute that in certain circumstances, and more often than not, expert
testimony is required to defend a motion

summary judgment. But this isn't one of those

circumstances. Genuine issues of disputed material fact, with all inferences drawn in favor of
Appellant should have precluded entry of summary judgment against Appellant. 12
Both the Respondents and the District Court

on the first phase of documents

that Respondents did everything Appellant asked them to do in drafting these documents.
Notwithstanding that this factual assertion is not true and/or there are genuine

of material

with respect to the allegations, the District Court looked to Appellant's Expert Witness
disclosure to purportedly ascertain what Mr. Larsen would or would not testify at trial to
determine whether Appellant's "claim survives." R000763. 13
The District Court noted in the Decision that Appellant's expert will testify that "Mr.
Davies drafted sales documents, regarding F.E.M., that were adverse to Mr. Ciccarello's
interests." R000759.
The District Court went on to find that the expert also would testify that"[ a]s a result of
Mr. Davies' breaching the applicable standard of care, he caused Mr. Ciccarello substantial
damage, including but not limited to the purchase price of F.E.M., in the amount of $2M,
through his drafting of the Independent Contractor Agreement. 14 R000759.

12

The District Corni confirmed "[b ]ut I don't think Ms. Points' burden has to prove a prima facia
case ... [bJut her burden is only to respond to the summary judgment." Tr., Vol. I, p. 8, LL 12 16.
13
IRCP 56 (c)(3) provides that the corni need consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.
14
This testimony meets the required standard; the requisite showing in an attorney malpractice
case is that an attorney client relationship existed, that the attorney had a duty to his or her client,
a breach of duty, and damages. See Greenfield v. Smith, 162 Idaho 246, 252, 395 P.3d 1279,
1285 (2017).
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Based on the Court's findings, Appellate met his elemental burden via his Expert Witness
the

opm1ons

Specifically, Mr. Davies drafted the ICA so that Lotus could stop making purchase
to Tv1r. Ciccarello in the event

incarcerated (which appeared inevitable at

the time of sale), and also drafted the Agreement so that it was terminable by Lotus under
specified circumstances. R000759.
If

. Davies had not included a termination provision, Lotus would not have the

"contractual option" to terminate the payments to Appellant if certain circumstances presented.
a result of Respondent

drafting Lotus had the option to terminate, and they exercised

it. Respondents took the position below

"any contract can be breached." However, the

point that is overlooked is that a breach of contract for non-payment is drastically different to
litigate (and recover on), than a "for cause" termination provision; giving your client (Lotus) the
means to legitimately and completely void an agreement in which they are obligated to pay
Appellant $2M. Tr., Vol I, p. 91, LL 7

13.

What was promised to Appellant by Respondents, as his attorneys, were new documents
that would effectuate a transfer of Appellant's shares in Baus from Mr. Henry, and payment of
$2M by Lotus for the purchase of F.E.M. Respondents did not take measure to assure these
things took place. Respondents didn't do everything Appellant asked them to do, or what they
promised Appellant's they would do. There is no gap in the evidence. The fact that the ICA
remained terminable by Lotus, alone, is sufficient to overcome summary judgment.
Mr. Larsen opined that Respondent Davies was negligent in drafting an agreement that
terminated his client's right to receive payments for the sale of F .E.M. to Lotus. On its face, that
statement means that a "non-negligent" attorney would not have included a termination
prov1s10n.

APPELLANT'S BRJEF

19

The District Court, instead of finding that genuine issues of material
summary judgment or

's opm10ns

precluded

"duty" question on

Respondents' motions were based, held "Mr. Davies may have been acting negligently, though
. Ciccarello· s

has to testify

. Ciccarello would

that ,vould have had a better result for Mr. Ciccarello if

terms

. Davies had been

non-

negligently." R000764.
Respondents never
ofno

that

in their respective motions. Appellant is aware

this

proposition that in an attorney negligence

has to establish, in addition to duty, breach

duty and

performed without the negligence, plaintiff would be better

that an expert

that if the "subject task" was
Other than being self-evident,

that is not the law, or a requirement, of this Court.
The District Court abused its discretion by granting Respondents' respective Second
Motions for Summary Judgment and the decision should be reversed.

B.

The District Court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's

Motions for Reconsideration by not considering declaration evidence
presented in those motions, and instead finding that Appellant should have
filed a separate motion for an extension of time under IRCP 56( d).

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on January 29, 2018, which was denied May
1, 2018. Appellant filed his motion for relief under IRCP 60 on May 7, 2018. In its decision
issued August 1, 2018, the District Court treated that motion as a second motion for
reconsideration. The following arguments address both rulings by the District Comi.

Applicable Law and Standard of Review. A district court has no discretion on whether to
entertain a motion for reconsideration pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11.2. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153
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Idaho 266, 276,
consider

1 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). On a motion for reconsideration, the court

ne,v admissible

or authority

on the correctness of the interlocutory

order. Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added). However, a motion for reconsideration need not
any new

or authority. Id; Johnson r.

143 Idaho 468, 473,

147 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. App. 2006). "Indeed, a rule requiring new evidence on a motion for
reconsideration ,vould be a cmise for concern. It would prevent a party from drmving the trial
court's attention to errors of law or fact in the initial decision, precluding correction of even
flagrant errors

through an appeal." Johnson

11,

1

Idaho at 473, 147 P.3d at l 05.

"W]hen reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration,
this Court utilizes the same standard ofreview used by the lower court in deciding the motion for
reconsideration." Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 276,281 P.3d at 113. Thus, "when reviewing the
grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, this
Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat
summary judgment." Id.; see also Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 545, 328 P.3d 520, 525
(2014).

1. Appellant's Expert Disclosure and the Declarations of Mr. Larsen establish

Appellant would have received a "better deal" from a non-negligent attorney.
On January 29, 2018, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
referenced Memorandum Decision. The crux of that motion was similar to Appellant's response
to Respondents' respective motions for summary judgment; that there are issues of fact with
regard to the first premise of Respondents' motion. The motions should have been denied at that
juncture. The issue of breach of duty or the sufficiency of expert testimony on the issue, became
irrelevant; a non-issue.
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Notwithstanding that the motions should have
Appellant's Expert

Disclosures

denied on the "issue of fact" basis,

Declarations

the District Court's claimed

"gap" in the evidence, that Appellant vmuld have received a "better deal" absent Mr. Davies
or

a non-negligent

the time the Memorandum Decision was
not

it appears that the District Court did

the benefit of the Declaration of Brian C. Larsen; Rebuttal
2018. In addition, Appellant submitted
his Motion

Reconsideration on January

Disclosure, filed

Second Declannion of Brian

Larsen

2018. 15 All submissions outlining the

testimony of Mr. Larsen's opinions squarely

the

the Court held to be lacking in

related to Appellant getting a "better deal" if Respondent Davies had not been
negligent. That is, they state the very opinion the Court held was lacking, with specificity.
Specifically, if there was no termination provision, Appellant vwuld have recourse against Lotus
for non-payment; he would have had a "better deal."
Because Respondent Davies drafted a termination provision and if Plaintiff performed
and act that qualified to be terminated for cause (and that cause was determined legitimate), he
had no recourse against Lotus. Moreover, Respondent Davies did not deliver what he had
repeatedly promised to Appellant; a new agreement with no termination provision. This last
point, the "no new agreement", was ignored throughout the underlying proceeding.
Even if the Court looked past the disputed facts and into Respondent's breach of duty
argument, implicit in Mr. Larsen's disclosure and subsequent Declarations, is that he has and

15

Respondent Law Firm asserts that the submission of the Second Declaration of Mr. Larsen is
untimely. It is not; it was filed in suppmi of Appellant's motion for consideration and clarifies
for the District Court (in response to the Memorandum Decision) the same opinions stated in his
earlier disclosures.
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will tcstify that

. Ciccarello "would have received [a] better deal terms that \Vould have had a
if

result
To

acting non-negligently." R000764.

opinions perfectly clear, Appellant also filed ·with his motion for
a

C.

Declaration

better deal terms that \Vould

that Appellant
a better result for Appellant if Respondent

had not been negligent R000776.
Specifically,

opmes:

To the extent it wasn't
in my initial expert disclosure summary or in my Declaration
executed and filed January
2018, it is my opinion that Mr. Ciccarello, absent Mr.
Davies' negligence, would
received better deal terms in the sale of F.E.M. to
if Mr. Davies would have acted in Mr. Ciccarello's interest. Put another \Vay, it \Vas Mr.
Davies negligence in drafting the Independent Contractor Agreement in the manner that
he did, that not only allowed Lotus to stop paying Mr. Ciccarello, but also gave Mr.
Ciccarello no recourse for Lotus' actions. Mr. Ciccarello would have received "better
deal terms" but for Mr. Davies' negligence.
Second Declaration of Brian C. Larsen,

iJ 3; R000777.

Moreover, Mr. Larsen opines in the Declaration of Brian C. Larsen; Rebuttal Expert
Disclosure ("Rebuttal Disclosure"), filed January 24, 2018, that:

It is Mr. Ciccarello's position that Mr. Davies told him that the sale of the documents
would be changed after the fear of forfeiture had passed. Mr. Ciccarello stated that while
the Asset Purchase Agreement and Independent Contractor Agreement represented one
transaction, the "true" transaction was something entirely different, and Mr. Davies,
pursuant to Mr. Ciccarello's deposition, assured Mr. Ciccarello that the sale documents
that all would be taken care of. In his deposition, Mr. Davies denied he ever told Mr.
Ciccarello that the sale documents would be changed, which is contradicted by Mr.
Davies attempting to change those documents at a later time to reflect the parties
transaction, including making payments for the purchase price non-terminable.
Rebuttal Disclosure, p. 4; R000753.
Mr. Larsen goes on to opine, that "[n]otwithstanding the fact that Respondent Davies
breached his duty to Appellant in drafting the sale documents, it was Respondent Davies' duty to
take necessary steps to ensure the sale documents would be modified at a later time, even if that
meant having the parties sign another set of documents at the time of the sale that would become
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effective on a condition precedent

Rebuttal Disclosure, p. 5; R000754. That is, when the

clears,

effective. Id.

Utilizing the District Court's language

this too would have resulted in a "better deal for

Appellant.
previously set forth, because there were several issues of fact pertaining to the factual
basis for Respondents' motions (i.e. that
explicit instruction), the motions should
In

put together a deal
been denied.

Ruling on Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration,

District Court simply ignored this
District Court instead

that

Appellants'

1,2018,the

admissible evidence filed in support of the motion. The
!ant cannot :file, or is somehO\v barred from :filing a motion

for reconsideration, because he should have sought additional time to supplement the record
under IRCP 56(d). R000807.
Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, the Rebuttal Disclosure and Second Declaration
of Brian C. Larsen unequivocally establish that but for Respondent Davies' negligence,
Appellant would have got a "better deal" than the deal structured by Respondent Davies. The
motions for reconsideration should have been granted.
The District Court abused its discretion when it refused to consider the Declarations of
Mr. Larsen in denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration.

II
II

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

24

2.
a

were

Instead of considering the Declarations of
Motion for Reconsideration,

. Larsen relied upon by Appellant in his

District Court held that the Appellant should

filed a motion

additional time under IRCP 56(d). R000809.
In ruling on Plaintiff's

(the t,vo declarations of
more time to supplement the

for Reconsideration, the Court didn't consider new
. Larsen), but only found Plaintiff should have

for

with an expert affidavit, relying on Greenfield v. 5i'mith, 162

Idaho 246,252, 395 P.3d 1279, 1285 (2017)(overcoming summary judgment ordinarily requires
expert testimony).

In this case, there appears to be a disconnect between IRCP 56 and lRCP 11.2. That is,
the Court granted Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgement. Plaintiff asked the
Court to reconsider its granting of that motion on several grounds, including that Plaintiff,
relying on two declarations of Mr. Larsen, now "played the card" that the Court held in ruling on
Defendants' motions, Plaintiff needed to play in order to defeat Defendants' Second Motion for
Sununary Judgment.
Specifically, the District Court held that the reply briefs on the motions for summaiy
judgment were filed on December 11, 1017, and oral argument was heard on December 18,
2017, and Appellant "did not ask for an extension under Rule 56(d), though he did submit a
supplemental affidavit of his expert on January 24, 2018. The affidavit offered additional
opinions by the expert about six weeks after oral argument and less than 24 hours before the
dispositive ruling. R000809. The District Court went on to hold that in "this case it was
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necessary to show that a non-negligent attorney would have got better deal terms that ·would
result" R000810.

had a

When determining whether a decision represents an abuse of discretion. this Court

"(1)
whether

court

the

court

the

as one

within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any

applicable to specific choices:. and (3) whether

court reached its decision

of reason." Id. (quoting Schwan 's Sales Enters., Inc. v. Idaho Tramp. Dept., 1
831, 136 P.3d 297, 3
for an abuse of

(2006)).

to an

Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho

an
Idaho

of attorney fees is also
, 897. 104 P.3d 367, 371

The District Court did not have the discretion not to entertain the motion for
reconsideration or to rcfirsc to consider the evidence relied upon in his motions for
reconsideration. The District Court abused its discre1.ion and took action that was inconsistent
with legal standards application to motions for reconsideration, as outlined in case law and IRCP

11.
Appellant timely filed the Declaration of Brian C. Larsen; Rebuttal Expert Disclosure, as
a rebuttal disclosure pursuant to the District Court's scheduling order, not in support of his
opposition to Respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment. Appellant timely filed the Second
Declaration of Mr. Larsen in support of his Motion for Reconsideration.
The District Court held that where a new issue "is raised at summary judgment that
additional time would cure, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide a remedy." R000809.
The only available remedy, per the District Court, would be to file an extension of time under
IRCP 56(d). The District Court did not make any finding as to why Appellant's motions for
reconsideration were not entertained.
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Appellant did not request an extension
s

time pursuant to Rule 56 (d) because it was

that no affidavit/declaration was

as.

on

which Respondents' Second Motions for Summary Judgment ,vas disputed/not true/flawed, and
on that

the

should have

The District Court went on to find that Appellants argument that
material
Court

sufficient to overcome summary judgment ...
found

testimony is required to establish a

were issues of
central issue that this

link between

. Davies's

conduct under the circumstances and Plaintiff's damages. R000810 (emphasis added).
Court was mistaken. Nevertheless,

"cured" the District Court's cla irned

requirement with the submissions of Mr. Larsen.
The District Court effectively refused reconsider its earlier ruling (which purportedly took
into account Mr. Larsen's expert witness disclosure) in light of the Rebuttal Declaration and
Second Declaration of Mr. Larsen.
The District Court did not take into account the declarations of Mr. Larson (or find that he
would not take them into account for any reason), but instead took the position that Appellant
should have chose a different path - that he should have asked for more time to file his expert's
opinions. R000809.
The District Court's denial of Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration by refusing to
consider the Declarations of Mr. Larsen, and on the basis that he should have filed a motion
under IRCP 56( d) was an abuse of discretion and those decisions should be reversed.

V.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court

reverses the subject holdings of the District Court be reversed, that the case be remanded for
trial, and that Appellant be awarded his attorney fees and costs incurred in pursuing this appeal.
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